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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to summarise the extant theory as it relates to the economics of 
trademark, and to give some suggestions for further research with reference to distinct streams of 
literature. The proposed line of study inevitably looks at the complex relationship between   
signs and economics. 
Trademark is a sign introduced to remedy a market failure. It facilitates purchase decisions by 
indicating the provenance of the goods, so that consumers can identify specific quality attributes 
deriving from their own, or others', past experience. Trademark holders, on their part, have an 
incentive to invest in quality because they will be able to reap the benefits in terms of reputation. 
In other words, trademark law becomes an economic device which, opportunely designed, can 
produce incentives for maximising market efficiency. This role must, of course, be recognised, as a 
vast body of literature has done, with its many positive economic consequences. 
Nevertheless, trademark appears to have additional economic effects that should be properly 
recognized: it can determine the promotion of market power and the emergence of rent-seeking 
behaviours. It gives birth to an idiosyncratic economics of signs where very strong protection tends 
to be assured, even though the welfare effects are as yet poorly understood. In this domain much 
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1.  Introduction 
 
A sign is anything that stands for something else
1. Words, for example, are signs used to 
represent objects, experiences, states of mind and much more.  
Human communities are loaded with signs, as are interactions between individuals. Signs are 
necessary instruments for social existence that perform a variety of functions. A sign is a container 
whose significance can be extended in different directions: it can have a literal meaning, that is to 
say a direct and straightforward interpretation, as well as a series of more complex and indirect 
complementary meanings which contribute in different ways to the communication process, 
broadening its scope. Religion provides an excellent example of this: the drawing of a fish, which 
has of course the direct and universal meaning of denoting an inhabitant of the sea, to followers of 
the Paleochristian religion also represents, by a complex association of ideas, a reference to God
2. A 
similar mechanism of indirect association occurs for the star (of David) which in the Hebraic 
religion identifies the religion itself. 
Signs emerge from any process of interaction between individuals, including the specific case of 
economic interactions. In particular, we note how at a certain point in human history, signs began to 
be used in markets specifically to answer the needs of trade. This ushered in the era of the 
trademark, which from its gradual beginnings rapidly gained momentum with the industrial era, and 
is today crucial to the existence of a market economy as we know it. 
A trademark is a sign used within economic activities by a producer or vendor to identify a 
particular product or service. In other words, it is a 'distinctive sign' that enables offerings of goods 
or services to be--more or less consistently--differentiated, and consequently enables consumers to 
distinguish between different goods and recognise their provenance. These attributes make 
trademark an extremely powerful economic device. 
However, although the law and marketing literature devoted to the role of trademark law and the 
use of branding
3 is fairly homogeneous and well-consolidated , the application of economic analysis 
to this same topic has instead been fragmentary, with different approaches leading to different 
results. There are in fact at least three distinct and poorly communicating lines of study that have 
                                                 
1 This definition is widely accepted. See for example the dictionary section of MSN Encarta 
(http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_1861735074/sign.html) which defines a sign as a ‘thing representing something 
else’ and then as ‘something that indicates or expresses the existence of something else not immediately apparent’. 
2 The reference is based on the acrostic of the Greek word for fish 'ichtys' made up of the Greek initials of the phrase 
"Jesus Christ, God's Son, Saviour' (Anonymous, 1985). In the remainder of this document this type of situation shall be 
described, using the language of trademark, with the term 'secondary meaning'. 
3 ‘A brand is a trademark, or combination of trademarks, which through promotion and use has acquired significance 
over and above its functional role of distinguishing the goods or services concerned’ (Blakett, 1998, p. 8). Branding is a 
practice that uses the information and attraction leverage created by the brand – the so-called ‘brand equity’ - to capture 
consumers (see Aaker, 1991 and 1996).   3
examined the role of trademark law from different economic perspectives. The first is the so-called 
law and economics perspective, under which trademark is viewed as a tool for pursuing efficiency. 
The second approach looks at the effects of trademark on market structure, focusing specifically on 
practices aimed at maximising the profits of the owners of the rights, that question, at least in part, 
the efficiency argument. Finally the third approach--as yet only roughly sketched out--attempts to 
examine trademark as an entity in its own right that can be treated as both an asset and a 
commodity. 
The present contribution will undertake to summarise the existing literature, and suggest some 
directions for further research.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a definition of trademark, briefly 
presenting its origins and characteristics. Section 3 summarises the economic theory connected with 
the Chicago Law and Economics tradition, which interprets trademark law as an economic device 
aimed at producing efficiency. Section 4 extends the analysis by introducing the literature which 
describes the further dynamic effects of trademark on the market structure, while section 5 focuses 
on the progressive process of unbundling marks from production and products. Finally, section 6 
contains the concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Definition and origins of trademark 
 
A trademark is a sign -- a logo, a name a word, a symbol or a combination thereof -- used by a 
producer or vendor to distinguish a particular product or service. Examples of this are the words 
Coca-Cola, Walkman, No.5 (for a perfume) and the Nike "swoosh" logo.  
Because creating distinctiveness is the primary attribute and function of a trademark, producers 
can in practice superimpose the use of different trademarks in order to better achieve this effect. In 
the case of Coca-Cola, for example, not only is the name protected by trademark law, but also the 
distinctive copperplate logo style (purportedly based upon the handwriting of the company's 
founder Frank M. Robinson), the shape of the bottle, the colour combination and much more. 
Individual elements such as these can be protected using either a single trademark, or several 
trademarks together (Blakett, 1998).  
Strictly speaking, trademark says nothing, or nearly nothing, about the composition or 
characteristics of the product: it simply identifies its origin, that is to say the maker of the good. 
However, purchasers can still glean information about the quality of the good from their own past 
experience or that of others (Economides, 1988 and 1998). Viewed in this way, trademark is   4
therefore a sign that resolves an information asymmetry problem (Riley, 1990), and this role is of 
course relevant to the economic analysis, and shall be discussed below. 
So it is by virtue of its ability to convey information and facilitate purchase decisions that 
trademark is given legal protection. This is explicitly acknowledged by the modern statutes which 
confer legal protection to a trademark on condition of its being 'inherently distinctive', i.e. able to 
directly fulfil its stated function.  
The signs that possess this attribute can generally be divided into three categories: ‘fanciful’, 
‘arbitrary’ and ‘suggestive’. A trademark is termed 'fanciful' if it consists of novel signs that do not 
have any pre-existing meaning, as in the case of the words "Exxon' or 'Xerox'. A trademark is 
considered 'arbitrary' when it does have a previous direct meaning, but in a such a vastly different 
field that there is no possibility of confusion. Examples of this are the 'Apple' brand of personal 
computers, 'Quaker' breakfast cereals, and 'Diesel' casual wear. Finally, a trademark is termed 
'suggestive' when it refers--even if indirectly--to some property of the product, as in the case of 
'Frigidaire' for the refrigerators or 'Business Week' for a weekly news magazine devoted to the 
world of business.  
On the other hand, if a trademark is not 'inherently distinctive'--meaning that the sign does not 
convey the requisite information and might even, on the contrary, elicit confusion--the owner 
receives legal protection only if the mark can be shown to have a 'secondary meaning' that directly 
associates it in the minds of consumers with the origin of the good. Examples of this are surnames 
used as the names of companies ('Ferrari', 'Armani', 'Levi's', etc.), descriptive terms such as 'All 
Bran' for whole grain breakfast cereals, and 'Digital' to indicate a maker of personal computers, as 
well as terms which originally referred to geographical locations such as 'Marlboro', 'San Francisco 
Chronicle', 'Paris Match', etc. (Economides, 1998; Landes and Posner, 2004). 
The information-conveying function of trademark is thus specifically recognised by the law and 
given explicit protection when it facilitates the purchase decisions of consumers.  
We cannot say exactly when trademarks first appeared on markets, though it is widely posited 
that 'trademarks have existed for almost as long as organised trade' (Blakett, 1998, p. 5). Progenitors 
of the modern trademark can be found in societies and cultures that are widely disparate, but share 
the common denominator of having developed sufficiently extensive roadway and communication 
systems. In fact, the development of long distance trade severs the direct--and trust-based--
relationship which exists between producers and consumers. The latter, in particular, will no longer 
be able to determine the origin (and hence the expected quality) of the goods, unless a specific sign 
is introduced for this purpose: namely, trademark. Its function is therefore to encapsulate and 
represent the origin of products, and so also their quality and authenticity.   5
Some examples of the above mechanism are the production of pottery in ancient Greece, the 
Etruscan kingdom and the Roman empire, or the production of pottery and silk in Imperial China. 
In all these cases, trademarks became important elements for conveying information about the 
origin of the goods (Rogers, 1910; Schechter, 1925; Wilkins, 1992; Blakett, 1998, Alford, 1995). So 
from its inception trademark had the specific function of conveying information about particular 
productions, and was used by individual craftsmen or guilds to denote the origin of goods and hence 
their quality of workmanship. However the protection afforded them was limited, often arising from 
a 'privilege'--meaning a particular favour granted to an individual or category of producers by the 
sovereign--rather than from any systematic body of regulations applicable to trade in general. As a 
consequence, legal protection was virtually non-existent and counterfeiting widespread (Blakett, 
1998; Alford, 1995). 
Notwithstanding this, trademark continued its inexorable advance with the expansion of markets 
and trade, and reached its maturity with the Industrial Revolution. The advent of mass production, 
which on the one hand extended the geographical range of production and consumption, on the 
other hand weakened the producer-consumer relationship due to the information problem created by 
increased distance. In the case of extended distribution chains, that often crossed national 
boundaries, a producer's reputation could no longer be maintained through any form of direct 
familiarity between buyers and sellers, and so trademark became a crucial element for the mediation 
of reputation-building.  
Theoretically speaking a trademark does not need to be registered, because its validity can 
established through use. And in fact this method was common when trade covered more limited 
geographical areas, facilitating surveillance and reducing the likelihood of conflict with other 
producers adopting similar signs. Unregistered trademarks are often denoted by the symbol 
TM. 
Today, although registration is not compulsory, it does give owners some significant advantages, 
including a more secure right that does not require demonstrating prior use, greater ease of 
protection, and virtually unlimited duration (except in the cases that will be discussed below). The 
symbol used to denote a registered trademark is ® . 
The current regulatory trend is toward a strengthening of trademark protection, allowing the 
owner of an exclusive right over a sign to easily transfer use of that sign to a different market, 
whereas in the past the same sign could be used by different vendors operating in distinct markets. 
This form of extended protection applies in particular to those trademarks that are designated 
'famous' or 'strong' (Blakett, 1998). 
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3.  Trademark and efficiency 
 
From a legal perspective, trademark is an exclusive right, that is to say a legal monopoly, which 
pursues the aim of creating new information. It is an intellectual property right attributed to the 
owner, at least in the first instance (though various possible extensions exist that will be discussed 
in section 5) to provide an incentive to produce information that is not itself the good being 
exchanged (as is instead the case for patent and copyright), but rather an accessory element to the 
exchange of other products (Ramello, 2005).  
In general, trademark conveys information relating to the quality of products and therefore 
facilitates and enhances consumer purchase decisions, while at the same time leveraging the 
reputation of producers to create an incentive for firms to produce goods or services of desirable 
quality, to the benefit of consumers and markets (Alchian and Allen, 1977; Landes and Posner, 
1987; Lott, 1988; Economides 1988 and 1998; Menell, 1999).  
This line of reasoning, widely accepted within the economic theory and the legal decisions of 
the courts (Beebe, 2005), was formalised by the theoretical contribution of Landes and Posner 
(1987, reviewed in 2004), and is as a whole informed by the so-called Law and Economics 
approach which sees trademark as an incentive to create information, for the benefit of markets.  
 
3.1 Trademark as information 
 
The premise being put forward, which appears to take on 'programmatic' contours (the adjective 
is Beebe's, 2004), is that “trademark law, like tort law in general […] , can best be explained on the 
hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency” (Landes and Posner, 1987, p. 
265). 
The underlying economic problem is information asymmetry as the cause of a market failure, 
described by Akerlof (1970) in the celebrated Market for Lemons. In the presence of uncertainty 
relating to the quality of goods, and in the absence of adequate and credible information, the 
consumer search cost to consumers in purchase decisions would escalate, while companies would 
have a greater incentive to mislead consumers as to the quality of the goods produced. The final 
outcome of such a situation is a reduction in both the average quality of products and the size of the 
market. Now, because the central problem in these cases is a divergence between social and private 
returns, an economic device can be introduced to redress their alignment and so maximise the social 
welfare. In other words, the optimal solution is to create an institution capable of "counteracting the   7
effects of quality uncertainty. […An] example of an institution which counteracts the effects of 
quality uncertainty is the brand-name good” (Akerlof, 1970, p.499). 
Trademark therefore reduces both the information costs and, generally speaking, the transaction 
costs within a market, promoting the attainment of competitive equilibria. In its role as a 'distinctive 
sign', trademark can indirectly inform consumers as to the quality characteristics of the branded 
product, even when these are not directly observable
4. At the same time, this mechanism creates an 
endogenous incentive for enterprises to avoid opportunistic behaviour and deliver a higher level of 
quality, in accordance with the precepts of the economic theory on 'reputation (see Shapiro, 1982). 
Therefore, from this perspective trademark law has the additional effect of extending the 
liability regime of producers, thereby functioning as an ex-post market regulation system. In fact, as 
Akerlof has already noted (1970, pp. 499-500) “[b]rand names not only indicate quality but also 
give the consumer a means of retaliation if the quality [of a given producer] does not meet 
expectations”.  
Further empirical studies have shown that the magnitude of trademark losses incurred by firms 
in the event of product recalls, airline crashes, deceptive advertising, fraud and the like is far greater 
than the actual value of damages caused. This would therefore appear to be not at a directly 
proportional compensation mechanism, but rather a penalising effect in which the value of losses 
incurred by the trademark holder may effectively exceed the damages caused (Jarrell and Peltzman, 
1985). From this perspective “[t]e loss of trademark capital has the same effect as a penalty clause 
in deterring a promisor for breaching [a contract]. Unlike a penalty clause, however, the wealth loss 
borne by the promisor does not accrue to the promisee; thus it does not provide an incentive to 
induce breach” (De Alessi and Staaf, 1994, p. 480)
5. In this sense, therefore, trademark has the 
additional function of producing a 'deterrent' effect in markets. The workings of this deterrence are 
decentralised, i.e. not enforced by any central body set up specifically for the purpose according to 
the 'command and control' method (in which case we would speak of ex-ante regulation), but rather 
by consumers who intervene more flexibly wherever they consider their rights to have been 
breached, according to the typical paradigms of liability mechanisms. 
Overall, according to a consolidated body of law and economics literature, the combined 
adoption of ex-ante regulation and liability is able to not only promote efficiency but also to 
produce an optimal level of deterrence, which constitutes a public good (Shavell, 1987).  
 
                                                 
4 Some scholars have however noted that in certain situations trademark can be instrumentally used to reduce the 
amount of information available, and so to pursue rent-seeking strategies (Dogan and Lemley, 2004). These practices 
constitute the 'dark side' of trademark and will be discussed below. 
5 The contribution of Png and Reitman (1994), along similar lines, points out the role of brand as an implicit guarantee 
of superior quality. See also Tadelis (1999):   8
3.2 Trademark and hierarchies  
 
Looking instead at the supply side, the existence of trademark and branding can have specific 
effects on the 'hierarchy' adopted by producers, and consequently facilitate the attainment of 
production efficiency (Williamson, 1985). We can therefore say that the countenance of today's 
economic activities has been profoundly affected by the existence of trademarks. 
In certain cases trademark has enabled the creation of vertically integrated firms. In fact, as 
pointed out above, if an increased distance between maker and buyer creates an information 
problem that can bring about a market failure (in the absence of trademark), the existence and 
effectiveness of trademark as a signal can conversely promote the creation of ever more extensive 
and decentralised production organisations, as compared with the previous system of local 
workshops and craftsmen. It is in fact difficult to imagine mass production without trademark to 
provide the "information umbrella" necessary for protecting consumers. What is more, certain 
observers consider that the emergence of large scale firms thanks to the trademark leads to other 
functional advantages, such as achieving minimum efficient scales in the production of goods or 
information, access to capital markets, the ability to attract and train specialised personnel, and 
optimising levels of R&D expenditure (Wilkins, 1992). 
In other situations, trademark results in the creation of smaller, specialised production units 
organised as standalone firms. In this case, the property rights attributed by trademark law can 
contribute to lowering transaction costs in accordance with the so-called 'new property rights 
approach', comprehensively discussed by Hart (1995). Trademark is the glue which averts 
opportunistic behaviour in these relationships, and permits the creation of vertical restraints. One 
example of such a relationship is franchising, which through use of trademark allows an upstream 
firm-(the franchisor) to specialise in the production of certain goods and services, also including 
reputation-building, while the downstream firm (the franchisee) is able to specialise in distribution 
and cut some of the risks connected with operating on the market, obviously subject to certain 
contractual terms designed to maintain the value of the reputation acquired by the franchisor 
(Treece, 1968; Mathewson and Winter,1985; Dnes, 1996). 
If the production specialisation made possible by trademark eventually enables firms to enjoy 
productive and informational economies of scale (the saverage information costs are decreasing in 
the quantity), by the same token it gives rise to economies of scope, as testified by the frequent 
production diversification of firms that rely heavily on trademark. This is a very common practice 
in those markets characterised by widespread recourse to so-called brand extension and brand 
stretching.    9
Such practices are essentially connected with the increasing returns to scope in the use of a 
trademark. Once a credible signal has been created, the firm can in fact use it to convey an 
equivalent amount of information about other, distinct products and this, in line with the above 
arguments, can lead to the emergence of multi-product firms (Economides, 1998).  
 
3.3 Economic features of trademark law 
 
In general, the efficiency-enhancing objective of trademark law can therefore be used to 
interpret the regulatory framework and the legal practices associated with it. Because the primary 
effect of trademark is informative, the distinctiveness of the sign becomes the central element for 
validating or negating its welfare-enhancing role, while the principles which govern its creation, 
enforcement and dissolution must be consistent the above stated efficiency criteria. 
The underlying rationale is that the objective of any communication system is to minimise 
information costs. In other words, there is a sort of 'economics of signs and language' that regulates 
the appropriability of the semiotic universe. So that, for example, if a trademark is considered 
'fanciful', there are no particular restrictions upon appropriability. The trademark is completely 
novel, and because it is possible to create ex-novo an infinite number of such words or signs, no 
information problem exists. The semiotic stock available to firms seeking to distinguish their 
products is potentially unlimited. 
The same principle also applies in the case of ‘arbitrary’ and ‘suggestive’ trademarks, although 
as Landes and Posner (1987, 2004) point out, because these are refereed to existing signs, the 
available stock is more limited. In any case, given the vastness of the resource--Webster’s Third 
International Dictionary, for example, lists 450 thousand words--the supply elasticity of signs is 
still sufficiently great to not create any problems.  
On the other hand, the efficiency balance is very different when the distinctiveness presumably 
effected by a trademark clashes with a pre-existing meaning, thereby compromising the informative 
function of the mark, or even contaminating the 'primary meaning' of the sign and its original 
informative worth to consumers. In this case the criterion of 'secondary meaning' is used to verify 
the effectiveness of the signal and limit appropriability to those cases where the descriptive term has 
clearly taken on the function of denoting a specific product (for example, 'All Bran' in the case of 
cereals). This restriction thus has the effect of averting rent-seeking appropriations that might 
attempt to transfer the 'primary meaning' of the sign to a specific product.  
For the same reason, it is therefore not possible to use generic signs as trademarks (for example 
the term 'car' as the trademark of a car manufacturer). In fact the social cost of such an operation   10
would exceed any informational benefits accrued to consumers by the trademark, because all other 
producers would incur the increased information costs of finding alternative expressions for 
identifying their products. Landes and Posner (2004) describe such a situation with the term 
‘language monopoly’, which aptly captures the resultant inefficiency (see also Carter, 1990).  
A similar efficiency criterion applies to the well known situation of a trademark (whether 
fanciful, arbitrary or suggestive) that has entered the common language, to become a generic term 
denoting an entire category of products (consider for example the trademarks ‘aspirin’, ‘yo-yo’, 
‘nylon’, ‘escalator’, ‘cellophane’, ‘thermos’, ‘kerosene’, typewriter’, etc.) (Economides, 1998). In 
this case the specific information-conveying effect of the sign lapses in favour of its general 
connotation, and maintaining the trademark is no longer be economically efficient because it would 
increase the overall communication costs between other producers and consumers. Therefore, the 
trademark is no longer protected.  
It is interesting to note that, in this particular case, trademark works exactly in the same way as 
patent and copyright: it provides an incentive to create new information by attributing a temporary 
exclusive right over the information produced. However--unlike patent and copyright, where this is 
the primary mechanism for exercise of the right--in trademark it is a sort of outside option for those 
situations where the public information-conveying value of the trademark exceeds its private value 
(Ramello, 2005).  
The above discussion provides an introduction to the debate on the 'duration' of trademark. In 
fact, although the duration of the right is theoretically infinite, in practice there exist a number of 
derogations to the property right designed to limit appropriability when the expected social costs 
exceed the benefits, as in the above example, or where there is no distinguishing effect--for example 
in the absence of 'secondary meaning'
6. A similar argument applies when a firm ceases trading, so 
that the distinguishing effect of its trademark no longer has any reason to exist. 
Finally, it is once again the distinctiveness criterion which governs the enforcement of 
trademark law in the case of infringement or dilution. The former is the unauthorised use of the 
trademark or the use of a misleadingly similar trademark on the part of another firm. The general 
principle is always to avoid creating any confusion, in the minds of consumers, as to the origin of 
the goods. Penalties for infringement have the function of reinstating the trademark's informative 
value, disrupted by opportunistic behaviour. In fact the infringer here acts as a free-rider who takes 
advantage of the information created by the trademark owner to produce goods of a different 
(generally lower) quality, without incurring the costs of creating the trademark, and so misleading 
                                                 
6 ‘Lack of distinctiveness would make the mark incapable of identifying the good and recalling to a consumer the 
information (generated by previous experience with the good by him or other consumers).” In such a case protecting the 
trademark would no longer answer the institutional objectives (Landes and Posner,2004, p. 187).   11
consumers. The final outcome is a lower average quality of goods, whether original or infringing, 
than there would have been under exclusive use of the mark, and a loss of credibility of the sign. In 
other words there is a return to the original situation of a market without marks
7.  
The case of dilution is similar, though somewhat more complicated. In fact this is not a violation 
as such, but rather a theoretically legitimate behaviour that can nevertheless compromise, lato 
sensu,  the distinguishing effect of a given trademark and is therefore forbidden by numerous 
national laws (Schetcher, 1927; Economides, 1998; Landes and Posner, 2004)
8. It should be noted 
here that the dilution objection is generally waived in the case of so-called 'famous' or 'strong' 
trademarks where the informative effect on consumers is very firmly established. What we are 
looking at here is therefore a sort of indirect violation. 
We speak of 'dilution by tarnishment' when the same (or a similar) sign is used by both the 
owner of the famous trademark and another producer for different goods, but the latter makes a 
product of inferior value which diminishes the overall value of the sign. An example of this might 
be a manufacturer of land mines that uses Armani as a trade name. This could, by the workings of 
an indirect psychological mechanism, alter the reputation of the famous Armani name in consumer's 
minds, and degrade its connotations of quality (Lunney, 1999). 
We speak of 'dilution by blurring' when the use of similar signs in two different markets 
diminishes the consumer's perception of the distinctiveness of the famous mark. For example, a 
firm that uses the trade name Martini to manufacture clothing would in a sense be appropriating 
some of the information conveyed by the Martini trademark--engaging in a form of indirect free-
riding--and so reducing the distinguishing effect of the mark. Because the assumption in these cases 
is that famous trademarks are associated with higher quality, which is the source of their stronger 
distinguishing effect (Landes and Posner, 1987 and 2004), the absence of anti-dilution protection 
would, from a dynamic perspective, compromise investments in quality. 
The concept of trademark dilution also implies the existence of a further effect of trademark that 
merits due consideration: the distinguishing effect of the sign, especially in the case of famous and 
strong trademarks, creates a complex psychological and economic dynamic that goes far beyond 
mere information-conveying value. This is a dynamic that can significantly alter the market 
structure and the behaviour of firms, as will be discussed in the following section. 
 
                                                 
7 The results of Grossman and Shapiro (1988a and 1988b), partly along the same lines, also show that under specific 
conditions, in the case of trade between different nations, the overall effect of trademark infringement may also be 
welfare enhancing. 
8 Many regulations incorporate anti-dilution clauses. In Europe, anti-dilution regulations have been enacted by member 
states as an implementation of Directive 89/104/CE. In the US the Federal Trademark Act of 1946, universally known 
as the Lanham Act, has been amended to include a specific anti-dilution measure from the Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act in 1995.   12
 
4.  Distinctiveness and market structure 
 
The previous paragraph discussed some of the economic effects of trademark: the creation of 
information that facilitates exchanges, making it possible to increase the distance between 
production and consumption, promoting the emergence of certain types of productive organisation, 
and exerting a deterrent effect. All of these arguments, taken together, portray trademark as a source 
of efficiency for the market. However implementation of the right may also impact upon the market 
structure and the relational behaviours of firms and consumers, and such effects must be factored 
into the final efficiency balance. 
In fact, the literature sources quoted thus far have always assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that 
the market will remain competitive. The information cost of trademark is for the most part treated 
as a production cost necessarily incurred to avert a failure of the competitive market, but which 
does not have any other significant effects on the choices of consumers (De Alessi and Staaf, 1994). 
In their contribution, Landes and Posner (1987 and 2004) propose a perfect competition market 
model in which the (final) gross price to consumers comprises both the net price– i.e. the money 
price paid out for the good--and its information costs
9. It follows that, for any given competitive 
gross price, the firm that can reduce the information costs of consumers through use of trademark 
will be able to command a higher net price for its goods. The demand curve remains horizontal, 
indicating that the various combinations of product quality and information provided by trademark 
are a single homogeneous good in the eyes of consumers. Now this will in effect be true in those 
situations where trademark has a purely informational role, so that the avoided or reduceds search 
cost represents exclusively an opportunity cost to consumers (Pashigian and Bowen, 1994).  
However this simplification overlooks the twofold nature of trademark, as an indication of 
quality as well as origin, a fact which alters the behaviour of consumers and their relationship with 
the goods, as legal practice has also clearly shown (Lunney, 1999). In fact, whereas an indication of 
origin completes the good by adding information and averts a market failure in the presence of 
information asymmetry, an indication of quality instead gives firms a novel opportunity to establish 
a preferential communication channel with consumers, and influence their decisions.  
                                                 
9 The cost to the consumer can be expressed using the formula  ) , , ( W Y T H P + = π , where π is the gross price paid 
by the consumer, P is the net price, and H is the information cost incurred by the consumer, which decreases as the 
strength of the brand (T) and the availability of signs (W) increases, but is more ambiguously related to other factors (Y) 
such as the number of competing signs/firms, the available technology for producing information, the cost of the 
buyer’s time, etc. The firm can mark up the price of the good by an amount equal to the reduction in the information 
costs to consumers brought about via trademark.   13
Therefore, trademark can be said to produce two separate kinds of distinctiveness, operating on 
two different levels, and which it is useful to examine separately. The first is an 'absolute' 
informational effect that tells individuals about the existence and origin of a good identified by a 
particular trademark. The second is a 'differential' informational effect, that causes consumers to 
perceive a particular trademark-protected good as different from all the others. This feature 
corresponds to the aptly termed legal definition of trademark 'strength', and refers to the impact 
which the sign has on consumers. When lawyers discuss trademark in court, they are principally 
concerned with its ability to distinguish itself from other trademarks, i.e. to the 'differential 
distinctiveness' (Beebe, 2005).  
If the differential distinctiveness effect prevails, that specific sign will take on for consumers a 
uniqueness that transforms it from a 'sign among signs' to a 'sign above other signs', a situation 
referred to as 'salience' or 'brand awareness' in marketing (Ehrenberg and Barnard, 1997; Aaker, 
1991)
10.  
These two levels of 'distinctiveness' are clearly defined on the semiotic plane, and not 
interchangeable. Failure to grasp their different economic effects may lead to representations and 
conclusions that do not reflect the reality (Beebe, 2004 and 2005).  
Consider, in this connection, the example of a consumer who walks into a shop and looks at a 
shelf of trademarked toothpastes. There are two possible perceptions that can be separately 
analysed. One is that the consumer recognises the existence of different kinds of toothpastes, i.e. 
produced by different firms, but considers them to be interchangeable. In this case, the 'source 
distinctiveness' effect of trademark prevails and the market is essentially competitive. The second 
possibility is that the consumer perceives the various toothpastes but considers one particular brand 
(say, WHITE) to be superior, perhaps as a result of past experience, because a dentist said so, and 
so forth. If this second effect prevails, the product WHITE will to a certain extent--proportionate to 
the strength of differentiation--become unique and poorly substitutable by other products. This 
consequence depends on the degree of 'differential distinctiveness'. 
The prevalence of one or the other effect is naturally not predetermined, but rather the net result 
of the workings of various mechanisms. This is consistent with the antitrust literature on the 
relationship between intellectual property rights and competition, which asserts that the rights do 
not necessarily produce market power. In our example this would correspond to the first case, 
where 'source distinctiveness' prevails. Intellectual property rights are at source a legal monopoly, 
which does not necessarily translate into an economic monopoly (Anderson, 1998). Nevertheless, 
the prospect of an economic monopoly and its attendant supra-profits gives right-holders a strong 
                                                 
10 'Salience' is defined as the positive feeling which a consumer associates with a particular trademark or brand.   14
incentive to adopt any behaviour that can enhance the (real or perceived) uniqueness of the product, 
making it poorly substitutable and so securing significant market power (Lunney, 1999; Ramello, 
2005; Nicita, Ramello and Scherer, 2005). 
We can therefore say that the value of trademark resides in its 'selling power', dependent “not 
merely upon the merits of the goods upon which is used, but equally upon its own uniqueness and 
singularity" which can be created and opportunely enhanced by the owner (Schechter, 1927, p.831). 
Trademark introduces the dimension of 'differentiation' into the market, leading to an 
endogenous modification of the market structure that is all the more pronounced as differentiation 
strategies become stronger, with the limiting case of the process being an economic monopoly, 
where the producer who succeeds in totally differentiating her/his product becomes the monopoly 
holder (Dixit, 1979; Singh and Vives, 1984)
11. 
In other words, when there is a significant differentiation effect, demand for the good becomes 
downward sloping and trademark functions as a barrier to the entry of competitors
12. Such a 
scenario suggests the risk of a different type of market failure which will also have an impact on the 
overall efficiency of the market. This is a problem that has been debated in the literature since the 
start of the 20th century (see Lunney, 1999; Lemley, 1999; Menell, 1999), but is still far from being 
definitively resolved -- although some scholars consider it irrelevant since the pro-efficiency view 
of trademark has prevailed in legal practice (Landes and Posner, 1987 and 2004). That said, the 
economic analysis of the right can provide a truly useful contribution from a regulatory perspective, 
by pointing out the weak points of any particular law.  
Although the question of the effects of perceived differentiation (i.e. identical products which 
are perceived as different and unique due to the effects of trademark) remains undecided, requiring 
as it does an evaluation of willingness to pay for semiotic content, there are nevertheless some 
undisputable negative effects arising from the rent-seeking practices that trademark holders may 
adopt in exercising the right. 
One example is the well-known case of 'brand proliferation' in the cornflakes sector 
(Schmalensee, 1978), where the production of a wide array of differently branded products by a few 
firms, under conditions which included the existence of increasing returns in production, had the 
aim of reducing the potential profitability of the market to competitors in order to restrict their 
entry.  
A similar strategy is being pursued today apparently without hindrance (despite the decades that 
have passed) by the owners of patented and branded pharmaceuticals, following the expiration of 
                                                 
11 The economic theory has extensively dealt with differentiation strategies, producing a substantial body of literature. 
For a thorough introduction see Tirole (1988) and Shy (1995). 
12 This argument applies in general to all intellectual property rights (Nicita, Ramello and Scherer, 2005).   15
their patents. In fact the introduction of so-called 'pseudo-generic' drugs, on the part of these 
companies appears to be chiefly aimed at prolonging their market power by deterring the entry of 
generic drugs (Morton, 1999; Kong and Seldon, 2004). 
Some observers have also noted a more subtle effect occurring in international trade: that 
because of the asymmetrical distribution of trademarks in favour of richer nations, the effects of 
brand loyalty on consumers can to a certain extent be leveraged to transfer market power acquired 
elsewhere, thereby distorting the development of local industry sectors (Baroncelli, Fink and 
Javorcik, 2005).  
The general hypothesis which emerges is that the use of trademark creates inertia in the 
consumers of an incumbent firm, resulting in persistence of its market power and altering the 
competitive scenario so that it no longer resembles any form of the Schumpeterian ‘innovation 
race’that certain contributions explicitly or implicitly assume (Schmalensee, 1982).  
Consumer inertia is a crucial side-effect of trademark, and can result in the erection of barriers 
to entry. Firms are well aware of these inertial effects, which are in fact the objective of creating 
brand loyalty, which seeks to endogenously generate and increase the switching costs of consumers 
in order to achieve lock-in (Aaker, 1991). Such practices have clear beneficial effects on the 
profitability of the firms which succeed in gaining market power, however their ultimate social 
welfare effects are not so obvious (Klemperer, 1995).  
 
5.  The unbundling process: the sign as asset and commodity  
 
The emergence of brand loyalty indicates the establishment of a special relationship between 
distinctive signs and consumers, which transcends the purview of information to touch upon the 
emotive and psychological spheres, with some clearly desirable implications for firms. This is a 
topic area which the economic theory has as yet only touched upon, but with some interesting initial 
results. 
In particular, certain authors have observed a sort of 'unbundling' taking place within different 
contexts, i.e. the trademark gradually detaching itself from the product to take on a physiognomy 
and character in its own right, able to be exploited on the markets in various ways. 
For example, adopting a supply-side perspective and looking at the literature which studies 
firms as bearers of reputation, Tadelis (1999) shows how trademark makes it possible to convert the 
reputational inertia acquired by firms in the past into a tradable asset that can be exchanged on the 
market like any other resource. The result is the emergence of a market for intangible assets which 
have a clear role in production, on a par with that of tangible assets.   16
A part of the scientific literature has also started to examine the emerging practice of 
transferring the signs and the related signals created through trademark between different markets, 
with beneficial effects on the firms that are thus able to reduce their information costs and possibly 
extend their market power. This opens up the chapter of ‘umbrella branding,’ a practice which takes 
the form of ‘brand extension’ when a trademark is transferred for use on another similar product, or 
of ‘brand stretching’ if the trademark is transferred to a very different product, and has recently also 
attracted the interest of industrial organisation researchers (Luini and Mangani, 2002)
13.  
Thus far, there has been no consistent economic evaluation of these practices, with the results in 
the literature pointing in different directions. For example some contributions focus on the 
possibility of resolving multiple information asymmetries on disconnected markets through the 
creation of a single sign which is then adopted for different productions (Choi, 1998; Cabral, 2000). 
Others look instead to identify the optimal strategies for firms who decide to extend their 
production into different sectors, all this with the non-trivial observation that consumers can 
sometimes derive added utility from the purchase of a branded product, even when the brand in 
question originates in a very distant market and would thus be difficult to justify with the traditional 
quality arguments (Pepall and Richards, 2002). In such cases marketing scholars speak of 'brand 
equity', meaning the 'incremental utility' to the consumer or the 'value added' to a product by its 
trademark (Aaker, 1991 and 1996; Keller, 1993; Rangaswamy, Burke and Oliva, 1993; Yoo and 
Donthu, 1999). Nevertheless, the evaluation of the resultant welfare effects remains unclear.  
Turning instead to address the problem of foreign counterfeiting, Grossman and Shapiro (1988) 
have found that when this practice is non-deceptive, i.e. when consumers are able to distinguish the 
fakes from the originals, it can have welfare-enhancing outcomes if the added utility to consumers 
who decide to purchase the counterfeited good does not exceed the externalities imposed upon the 
trademark owners. Also in this case, the consumption of a sign, even if counterfeited, generates 
additional utility to consumers. What is more, the described effects can be enhanced in the presence 
of demand network externalities, as has been shown by authors in complementary fields (Grilo, Shy 
and Thisse, 2001).  
Although the overall evaluation of the social welfare effects remains unsatisfactory, the above 
mentioned contributions still have the undisputed merit of pointing out an important change in the 
role of trademark: the sign has become, at least in part, an economic entity in its own right, 
producing specific utility, characterised by a specific willingness to pay, and which to a certain 
extent exploits the tangible dimensions of products in order to take part in exchanges.  
                                                 
13 An example of brand extension is the production of iPod on the part of Apple. An example of brand stretching is the 
production of soft drinks by Virgin, an airline operator (and before that, a recording label).   17
The observation appears to be confirmed by international law, with the court decisions testifying 
to the gradual separation of signs from specific products. Some authors speak ironically of a 
'divorce' of trademarks from the goods they are supposed to represent, entrained by the 
interpretation as a specific property right over a semiotic entity that takes part in exchanges in 
various ways (Lemley, 1999). This has naturally been accompanied by an increasingly broad 
interpretation of trademark scope--as evidenced by the concept of dilution discussed in section 3.3--
and which marks a growing appropriation of the semiotic or semantic universe.  
The end result is the transformation of trademark into a commodity (Beebe, 2004). The sign and 
its meaning, by their nature intangible, are exchanged in conjunction with other goods, not only to 
remedy information asymmetries but also to satisfy various needs of individuals within the 
psychological and social spheres. This is accompanied by the emergence of a 'sign value' that 
sometimes corresponds to the final price paid for the trademark--or rather to the differential with 
respect to an unbranded product--but can in reality have much wider implications that are not fully 
reflected by the monetary value. Individuals consume particular goods or signs to display status, to 
communicate their adherence to (or distance from) a social group, and to perform other complex 
social functions
14. 
This is the insight which Veblen (1899), in his celebrated book The Theory of Leisure Class, 
described with the term 'vicarious consumption': i.e. that consumption of a good can sometimes 
include production of a message (a meaning) that is not strictly tied to the function of the good. 
Trademark, as a sign and hence a bearer of meaning, amplifies this dimension and can be shown to 
operate on two levels: one being the ordinary sphere of tangible economic values, and the other the 
more intangible spheres of communication, meaning and relationships between individuals. This 
argument, often put forward as a criticism of the neoclassical tradition by the heterodox approach 
and by the other social sciences (see Babe, 1995; Baudrillard, 1972), has also stimulated some 
original contributions in the mainstream economic tradition that seek to better understand consumer 
behaviour (Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996; Corneo and Jeanne, 1997). The initial results are 




                                                 
14 An interesting reflection is put forward by Beebe (2004, p.624): “In asserting that trademarks do no more than 
facilitate search and encourage quality, the [Law and Economics approach] has long declined to acknowledge what is 
obvious: that firms produce trademarks as status goods, that consumers consume trademarks to signal status, and that 
courts routinely invest trademarks with legal protection in an effort to preserve this status-signalling function […] 
Entire areas of trademark doctrine cannot be understood except as systems of rules designed to facilitate the 
commodification […] of social distinction.”   18
6.  Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to summarise the extant theory as it relates to the economics 
of trademark, and to give some suggestions for further research referring to distinct streams of 
literature. The proposed line of study inevitably passes through the relationship--as yet not fully 
understood--between economics and signs. 
The appearance of trademark as a sign used in exchanges can be traced to the increased 
separation between the points of production and sale, and so between the makers and buyers of a 
good. This process generates a market failure caused by the information asymmetry to consumers, 
who are no longer able to determine the provenance or quality of the products which they purchase. 
The result is the classic economics of information problem described by Akerlof (1970), in which 
the market is impoverished in terms of both transactions and quality. Trademark is the sign 
introduced to remedy the market failure; it facilitates purchase decisions by indicating the 
provenance of the goods, so that consumers can attribute to the offering specific quality attributes 
deriving from their own, or others', past experience. Trademark holders, on their part, have an 
incentive to invest in quality because they will be able to reap the benefits in terms of reputation. In 
other words, trademark law becomes an economic device which, opportunely designed, can produce 
incentives for maximising market efficiency. This role must of course be recognised, as a vast body 
of literature has done, with many important economic results. 
However from a broader perspective, trademark appears to do more than simply correct a 
market failure in the production of information: it has additional dynamic effects which, though 
largely overlooked, unequivocally contribute to the overall efficiency balance. Examples are the 
promotion of barriers to entry, market power and rent-seeking activities in general that bear little 
relation to information-conveying mechanisms or the attainment of efficiency, as well as the 
creation of a market of signs where very strong protection tends to be assured, even though the 
welfare effects are as yet poorly understood.  
The economic analysis should increasingly pay attention to these issues when studying the 
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